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Abstract—Due to the publicly-known and deterministic char-
acteristic of pilot tones, pilot authentication (PA) in multi-
user multi-antenna OFDM systems is very suspectable to the
jamming/nulling/spoofing behaviors. To solve this, we in this
paper develop a hierarchical 2-D feature (H2DF) coding theory
that exploits the hidden pilot signal features, i.e., the energy
feature and independence feature, to secure pilot information
coding which is applied between legitimate parties through
a well-designed five-layer hierarchical coding (HC) model to
achieve secure multiuser PA (SMPA). The reliability of SMPA
is characterised using the identification error probability (IEP)
of pilot encoding and decoding, with the exact closed-form
upper and lower bounds. However, this phenomenon of non-
tight bounds brings about the risk of long-term instability in
SMPA. Therefore, a reliability bound contraction (RBC) theory
is developed to shrink the bound interval and practically, this
is done by an easy-to-implement technique, namely, codebook
partition within the H2DF code. In this process, a tradeoff
between the upper and lower bounds of IEP is identified and
a problem of optimal upper-lower bound tradeoff is formulated,
with the objective of optimizing the cardinality of sub-codebooks
such that the upper and lower bounds coincide. Solving this,
we finally derive an exact closed-form expression for IEP, which
realizes a stable and highly-reliable SMPA. Numerical results
validate the stability and resilience of H2DF coding in SMPA.
Index Terms—Physical-layer authentication, anti-attack, multi-
user OFDM, channel training, hierarchical 2-D feature coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
R
ADIO security, either from a tactical perspective or in a
commercial viewpoint, has drawn increasing attentions in
wireless communication systems. The sophisticated character-
istic of radio channels, such as the open and shared nature,
create an operating environment vulnerable to intentional
information security attacks that target specific radio technolo-
gies [1]. Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM)
technique becomes such a typical victim when it plays an
increasing role in modern wireless systems, standards (e.g.,
LTE, 802.11a/n/ac/ax/ah) or even under tactical scenarios [2].
Without comprehensive precautions against attacks, OFDM
technique comes to be sensitive and fragile in the respect
of its waveform transmission and receiving which is very
vulnerable to various physical-layer attacks [3], [4]. This paper
investigates the pilot-aware attack on the channel estimation
process in multi-antenna OFDM communications [5]. Conven-
tionally, channel estimation is performed with high accuracy
by using the publicly-known and deterministic pilot tones
that are shared on the time-frequency resource grid (TFRG)
by all parties [6]. Basically, the estimation performance is
guaranteed by perfect pilot authentication (PA) [7], since the
authentication signal [8], [9], i.e., a unique pilot tone from one
certain legitimate user (LU), is verified, therefore, known at
the receiver (named Alice), and finally is enabled for precise
channel estimation that belongs to the LU. In other words,
guaranteeing an exact and unique pilot tone for one LU means
authenticating the authenticity of its channel state information
(CSI), if estimated. However, PA mechanism lacks specialized
protections from the beginning and a pilot-aware attacker,
named Ava, can easily jamm/null/spoof those publicly-known
pilot tones by launching pilot tone jamming (PTJ) attack [10],
[11], pilot tone nulling (PTN) attack [12] and pilot tone
spoofing (PTS) attack [13]. Finally the channel estimation
process at Alice is seriously paralyzed.
A. Related Works
Basically, secure PA here refers to confirming the authen-
ticities of pilot tones from LUs suffering above three attacks.
This includes how to detect any alteration to their authenticities
and how to protect and further maintain high authenticities.
Since PA also means authenticating CSIs, much work have
been extensively investigated on this area, from narrow-band
single-carrier systems [14]–[21] to wide-band multi-carrier
systems [5], [7], [10]–[13], [22].
The issue in PA in narrow-band single-carrier systems was
introduced in [14] in which a pilot contamination (PC) attack,
one type of PTS attack, was evaluated. Following [14], much
work were studied, but limited to detecting the alteration to
pilot authenticities by exploiting the physical layer informa-
tion, such as auxiliary training or data sequences [15]–[18] and
some prior known channel information [19]–[21]. The issue in
PA in multi-subcarrier scenarios was first presented by Clancy
et al. [10], verifying the possibility and effectiveness of PTJ
attack. Following this, PTJ attack was then studied for single-
input single-output (SISO)-OFDM communications in [11]
which also introduced the PTN attack and then extended
it to the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)-OFDM sys-
tem [12]. The initial attempt to safeguard PA under pilot aware
attack was proposed in [22], that is, transforming the PTN
and PTS attack into PTJ attack by randomizing the locations
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Fig. 1. (a) Diagram of the general procedures for SMPA; (b) Specific procedures for SMPA.
and values of regular pilot tones on TFRG. It figured out the
importance of random pilot tone scheduling for avoiding the
pilot aware attack. Hinted by this, authors in [13], for a single-
user scenario, proposed a coding based PA framework under
PTS attack by exploiting pilot randomization and a subcarrier-
block discriminating coding (SBDC) mechanism. In [5], the
authors considered a practical one-ring scattering scenario in
which a specific spatial fading correlation model, rather than a
general form in [13], was investigated. They also proposed an
independence-checking coding (ICC) theory for which SBDC
could be just seen as its special form. However, the SBDC
and ICC method can only differentiate two nodes (including
Ava) at most since one more node will incur confusion on
the discriminative feature, basically a binary result (e.g., the
number of 1 digit is more than that of 0 digit, or not.),
mentioned therein. Out of consideration for this, authors in [7]
considered a two-user scenario and proposed a code-frequency
block group (CFBG) code to support PA between two LUs.
It introduced the necessity of a three-step solution, including
pilot conveying, separation and identification. The biggest
problem is that when randomly-imitating attack happens, the
code is invalidated and PA then highly relies on the difference
between spatial fading correlations of LUs and Ava whose
correlation model is generally hard to acquire. If Ava has the
same correlation property with one LU, for example, it has
the same mean angle of arrival (AoA) as one certain LU, the
PA for that LU is also paralysed completely.
B. Motivations
The above observations prompt us to establish a secure
multiuser PA (SMPA) mechanism from the point of view of
a pure coding approach and also a multi-user perspective. As
shown in Fig. 1 (a), pilot randomization is a prerequisite. Then
the procedures of pilot conveying, separation and identifica-
tion [5], [7] are adopted, but with extra basic considerations.
Procedure 1 (Pilot Conveying). Selectively activating and de-
activating the OFDM subcarriers to create various subcarrier
activation pattern (SAP) candidates; Encoding SAPs in such
a way that those SAPs can carry pilot information in the form
of codewords;
We emphasise that the pilot information in this paper refers
to the pilot phases which are then randomized. More clearly
and intuitively, the overall process is depicted in Fig. 1 (b)
and described as follows:
We insert multiuser pilot tones into subcarriers on TFRG in
such a way that every single pilot subcarrier for SAP and those
for frequency-domain subcarrier (FS) channel estimation ( thus
for channel impulse response(CIR) estimation) are located
within the range of coherence bandwidth but at different
frequency-domain positions. For the sake of simplicity, we
configure one pilot subcarrier for FS channel estimation and
one paired pilot subcarrier for SAPs. This operation guarantees
the mutual independence of FS channels among adjacent
positions of each SAP.
On this basis, each LU independently conveys their own pi-
lot phase in the form of encoded SAPs which are programmed
by codewords. The specific principle is that if the j-th digit
of the codeword is equal to 1, the pilot tone signal is inserted
on the j-th subcarrier, otherwise this subcarrier will be idle.
In what follows, pilot separation and identification naturally
means codeword separation and identification.
In this context, the attacks will be transformed from PTJ,
PTS, PTN into the following hybrid mode:
Problem 1 (Attack Model). A hybrid attack will include:
1) Silence Cheating (SC): Ava keeps silence to misguide
Alice since Alice cannot recognize the non-existence of
attacks.
2) Wide-Band Pilot (WB-PJ): Ava activates the whole
available subcarriers and thus launches WB-PJ attack
to interfere LUs. Therefore, the interpreted codeword at
Alice is a vector with all elements“1”, which carries no
information.
3) Partial-Band Pilot Jamming (PB-PJ): Ava arbitrarily
activates part of the subcarriers and launches PB-PJ
attack. The codeword interpreted from the observation
subcarriers at A Jamming lice is seriously interfered and
misguided if no special coding measure is taken.
4) Unpredictability: Ava could learn the pilot tones
employed by each of LUs in advance and jam-
ming/spoofing/nulling the pilot tones of arbitrary one LU
of interest. This is done by searching the list of target
3LUs in store for attacking. This list is only known by
Ava and unpredictable for both Alice and LUs.
Now the security goals require not only maintaining PA
among LUs but also protecting those established PA from
being attacked. We can see that PA is a probabilistic event
and the security goal turns to be the reliability of pilot
encoding/decoding.
We denote the first requirement by the Multiuser Guar-
antee which is demonstrated in Problem 2 and denote the
second one by the Attack Resistance for which the attack
model is given in Problem 1. The relationship among pilot
randomization, multiuser guarantee and attack resistance is
depicted in Fig. 1 (a).
Problem 2 (Multiuser Guarantee). The multiuser guarantee
that is ensured by codewords includes three aspects:
P. 2.1 Unique Pre-Separation Identification (UPrSI): To
guarantee that each codeword has a unique identifer.
P. 2.2 Uniquely Decipherable (UD): P. 2.2.1: To guar-
antee that each superposition of up to K different
codewords is unique. P. 2.2.2: To guarantee that
each of the superimposed codeword can be correctly
decomposed into a unique set of K codewords.
P. 2.3 Unique Post-Separation Identification (UPoSI):To
ensure that each of decomposed codewords is iden-
tified uniquely.
For the second procedure to be designed, we stress that
multiuser guarantee and attack resistance must be considered.
Procedure 2 (Pilot Separation and Identification: A Mathemat-
ical Problem). Those codewords for pilot conveying should be
optimized such that those codewords, though overlapped with
each other (Multiuser Guarantee) and/or even disturbed by
Ava (Attack Resistance), can be separated and identified with
high reliability, thus decoded into the original pilots.
Having understood above procedures theoretically, we now
turn to generally introduce the practical procedures as the
Fig. 1 (b) indicates. LUs and Ava create SAPs representing
their own randomized pilot phases to be transmitted. Those
SAPs, after undergoing wireless channels, suffer from the
superposition interference from each other, and finally are
superimposed and observed at Alice which separates and
identifies those pilots. This is a basic process of multiuser
PA. Finally those authenticated pilots are utilized for channel
estimation using the estimator in [5]. Until now, we have
clarified the procedures and key issues for achieving SMPA.
C. Contributions
Solving above issues requires a reliable coding support. In
a physical sense, the signals from each node carry a lot of
features, such as, energy, independence and so forth, depend-
ing on how each node uses it. Different from the previous
extra information, like spatial correlation information, these
signal features, when generated, have already been hidden in
the signals and thus there is no need to provide them priorly
by system operators. The key is whether or not we could dig
them out and how we use them.
For the first time, we propose exploiting those signal
features to secure information coding and aim to answer the
question, namely, can the hidden signal features improve the
performance reliability of conventional coding technique in
attack environment? We show the answer is yes, and stress
that this novel and general comprehension towards coding
technique constitutes the core of our H2DF coding theory.
Before detailing our contributions, we need to clearly un-
derstand what type of signal structures Alice can employ, and
recognize the steps involved. In this paper, four basic steps
are modeled, including 1. extracting features, i.e., energy
feature and independence feature; 2. representing features;
3. encoding features; 4. decoding features. Of all the four
steps, feature encoding and decoding are the core compo-
nents determining the final performance of SMPA mechanism.
Along the lines of Procedure 1 and 2, we summarize the main
contributions of this paper as follows:
1) Basically and inevitably, we consider examining the
superposition characteristics of multiple potential signals
on each single pilot subcarrier. We find that thanks to
the indelible and unique nature of the signal energy
from each node, we could extract and represent the
energy feature through the well-known energy detection
technique as the number of signals detected on each
subcarrier. We encode the derived number as code digits
(including binary digits) and construct a code-frequency
domain on which we formulate feature encoding matri-
ces in the form of codebooks by deliberately grouping
the digits into codewords. Each binary codeword within
codebooks could precisely indicates how each of SAPs
is triggered, thus achieving Procedure 1.
2) 1) We further identify the second feature as the in-
dependence feature of pilot signals from each node.
A differential coding technique is well designed to
fully extract and represent this kind of feature as the
binary code. In this way, the previous feature encoding
matrices is enabled to include the code information
of both energy and independence features. The feature
encoding matrices are optimized by subtly coupling the
differential code with the cover-free code with the aim
of supporting multiuser guarantee, which constitutes the
encoding functionality of H2DF coding theory. 2) For
the decoding functionality, we construct a hierarchical
decoding (HD) model to achieve attack resistance on
the basis of multiuser guarantee, which finally realizing
Procedure 2.
3) The reliability of the overall encoding and decoding rep-
resents the resilience performance of SMPA against at-
tacks. To characterize this metric, we formulate the con-
cept of identification error probability (IEP), bounded by
the exact upper and lower bounds. This phenomenon
of bound fluctuation due to the random selection of
the codewords by each node indicates the long-term
instability in SMPA. In order to reduce this instability,
a tradeoff between the upper and lower bounds is
discovered, which prompts us to formally develop the
bound contraction theory to further shrink the bound
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Fig. 2. System model of K-user MISO-OFDM system under the pilot aware
attack in the uplink.
interval. A technique of codebook partition is proposed
to achieve this successfully and an optimal upper-lower
bound tradeoff is realized. Under this tradeoff, an exact
closed-form expression of IEP is derived, thus creating
a stable and highly-reliable SMPA performance.
Organization: In Section II, we present an overview of
pilot-aware attack on multi-user PA in multi-antenna OFDM
systems. In Section III, we introduce the encoding principle
of H2DF coding theory. The decoding principle of H2DF
coding theory is described in Section IV. A reliability bound
contraction theory is provided in Section V. Simulation results
are presented in Section VI and finally we conclude our work
in Section VII.
Notations: We use boldface capital letters A for matrices,
boldface small letters a for vectors , and small letters a for
scalars. A∗, AT, AH and A (:, 1 : x) respectively denotes the
conjugate operation, the transpose, the conjugate transpose and
the first x columns of matrix A. ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean
norm of a vector or a matrix. |·| is the cardinality of a set.
E {·} is the expectation operator. ⊗ denotes the Kronecker
product operator. Diag {a} stands for the diagonal matrix with
the elements of column vector a on its diagonal.
II. MULTI-USER PA UNDER PILOT AWARE ATTACK:
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
We in this section outline a fundamental overview of multi-
user PA issue under pilot aware attack, from a mathematical
point of view. We will begin the overview by introducing
the basic system and signal model, and then demonstrate this
issue. Besides this, we will describe the advantage of pilot
randomization in avoiding this issue and most importantly,
identify the key challenge.
A. System Description and Problem Model
We consider a synchronous multi-user multiple-input single-
output (MISO)-OFDM systems with a NT-antenna Alice and
K single-antenna LUs. Here, pilot tone based multi-user chan-
nel estimation is considered in the uplink [6]. Conventionally,
multi-user PA is accomplished by assigning LUs with publicly-
known and deterministic pilot tones that can be identified. This
mechanism is very fragile and actually has no privacy. Without
imitating the identities of LUs, Ava merely with single antenna
can synchronously interfere pilot tones indexed by ΨAE and
launches the behaviors shown in Attack Model.
B. Signal Model
In this subsection, we formulate the receiving signal model
at Alice. To begin with, we will give the concept of pilot
insertion pattern (PIP) which indicates the way of inserting
pilot tones across subcarriers and OFDM symbols.
Assumption 1 (Frequency-domain PIP). We in this pa-
per assume xjL,m [k] = xL,m [k] =
√
ρL,me
jφk,m , ∀i, i ∈
ΨLE,m ∈ K for low overhead consideration and theoretical
analysis. Alternatively, we can superimpose xiL,m [k] onto
a dedicated pilot sequence optimized under a non-security
oriented scenario and utilize this new pilot for training. At this
point, φk,m can be an additional phase difference for security
consideration. We do not impose the phase constraint on the
PIP strategies of Ava, that is, xiA [k] =
√
ρAe
jϕk,i , i ∈ ΨAE .
Let us proceed to the basic OFDM procedure. First, the pilot
tones of LUs and Ava over NLE subcarriers are respectively
stacked as NLE by 1 vectors xL,m [k] =
[
xjL,m [k]
]T
j∈ΨL
E
and
xA [k] =
[
xjA [k]
]T
j∈ΨA
E
. Assume that the length of cyclic
prefix is larger than the maximum length Ls of all channels.
The parallel streams, i.e., xL,m [k], m ∈ K and xA [k], are
modulated with inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT).
Then the time-domain NLE by 1 vector y
i [k], derived by
Alice after removing the cyclic prefix at the i-th receiving
antenna, can be written as:
yi [k] =
K∑
m=1
HiC,mF
HxL,m [k]+H
i
C,AF
HxA [k]+v
i [k] (1)
Here, HiC,m is the N
L
E × NLE circulant matrices of the m-th
LU, with the first column given by
[
hi
T
L,m 01×(NLE−Ls)
]T
.
HiC,A is a N
A
E × NAE circulant matrix with the first column
given by
[
hi
T
A 01×(NAE−Ls)
]T
and hiA is assumed to be
independent with hiL,m, ∀m ∈ K.
Taking FFT, Alice finally derives the frequency-domainNLE
by 1 signal vector at the i-th receive antenna as
y˜i [k] =
K∑
m=1
FLh
i
L,mxL,m [k]+Diag {xA [k]}FLhiA+wi [k]
(2)
where wi [k] = Fvi [k].
C. Multi-User Channel Estimation Model
We only focus on the FS estimation model under PTS attack
mode. Ava impersonates the m-th LU by utilizing the same
pilot tone learned. In this case, there exists ΨLE ∪ ΨAE = ΨLE
and xiA [k] = xL,m [k] , ∀i, i ∈ ΨLE. Stacking y˜i [k] within K
OFDM symbol time, we can rewrite signals in Eq. (2) as:
YiPTS =
K∑
j=1
FLh
i
L,jxL,j + FLh
i
AxL,m +W
i (3)
5TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS.
Notations Description
NT, K Number of transmitting antennas at BS and number of LUs.
NL
E
;NA
E
Number of subcarriers for CIR estimation: for the m-th LU; for Ava.
NL
P
(NL
P
= B);NA
P
Number of subcarriers for performing SAPs: for the m-th LU; for Ava.
K = {1, . . . ,K}; K Index set of LUs; Index set of K columns employed by K LUs in B.
ΨL
E
=
{
i0, i1, . . . , iNL
E
−1
}
, ΨA
E
=
{
i0, i1, . . . , iNA
E
−1
}
Index set of subcarriers for CIR Estimation: for the m-th LU; for Ava.
ΨL
P
=
{
i0, i1, . . . , iNL
P
−1
}
, ΨA
P
=
{
i0, i1, . . . , iNA
P
−1
}
Index set of subcarriers for performing SAPs and coding: for the m-th LU; for Ava.
xi
L,m
[k] , i ∈ ΨL
E
, m ∈ K; xi
A
[k] , i ∈ ΨA
E
Pilot tones at the i-th subcarrier and k-th symbol time: for the m-th LU; for Ava.
ρL,m, ρA; φk,m, ϕk,i Uplink training power: the m-th LU; for Ava; Pilot phases: the m-th LU; for Ava.
hi
L,m ∈ C
Ls×1; hi
A
∈ CLs×1 CIR vectors, respectively from the m-th LU and Ava to the i-th receive antenna of Alice.
Ls; σ
2 Number of sampled multi-path taps in baseband, Average noise power of Alice.
F ∈ CN
L
E×N
L
E ; FL; Tc DFT matrix; FL =
√
NL
E
F (:, 1 : Ls); Channel coherence time
vi [k] ∈ CN
L
E×1, vi [k] ∼ CN
(
0, INL
E
σ2
)
Noise vector on time domain at the i-th antenna of Alice within the k-th symbol time.
A; T = {k0, . . . , kTc−1} {φ : φ = 2mpi/C, 0 ≤ m ≤ C − 1, C = |A|}; Set of OFDM symbols within Tc .
Mi Number of signals detected on the i-th subcarrier.
yi [k] ∈ CNT×1 Receiving signals stacked at the i-th subcarrier within the k-th OFDM symbol.
wi ∈ CNT×1 Noise signals at the i-th subcarrier;
gL
k,i
∈ CNT×1; gEi ∈ C
NT×1 Channel frequency response vectors of the k-th LU and that of Ava at the i-th subcarrier.
ni; c Jamming pilot symbols of Ava on the i-th subcarrier; Codeword of Ava.
bS,K and mS,K SP sum and ASP sum of H2DF codewords from all LUs;
bI and mI SP sum and ASP sum of c with H2DF codewords from all LUs;
bS,K,i; mS,K,i; bI,i; mI,i; ci The i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ B) element of bS,K , mS,K , bI, mI and c.
BK and MK Set of all column vectors of BK and MK ;
D Set of position indices of digits in bI. ∀i ∈ D, mI,i = 1.
where the NLE × K matrix YiPTS satisfies
YiPTS =
[
y˜i[k]1≤k≤K
]
. The 1 × K vector xL,m satisfies
xL,m=
[
xL,m[k]1≤k≤K
]
andWi is also a NLE×K matrix with
Wi =
[
wi[k]1≤k≤K
]
. For simplification, we exemplify the
orthogonal pilots to demonstrate the influence of PTS attack.
Given the orthogonal pilots with xL,mx
+
L,n = 0, ∀m 6= n, a
least square (LS) estimation of hiL,m, contaminated by h
i
A
with a noise bias, can be given by:
ĥ =


FLh
i
L,1 + FLh
i
A +W
i(xL,1)
+ if m = 1
FLh
i
L,2 + FLh
i
A +W
i(xL,2)
+ if m = 2
...
...
FLh
i
L,K + FLh
i
A +W
i(xL,K)
+
if m = K
(4)
where (·)+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse. As to de-
scribing PTN attack and PTJ attack, we can refer to the
mathematical interpretation in [5]. As we can see, the channel
estimation is completely paralysed and unable to be predicted
in advance. Note that this phenomenon also occurs even if non-
orthogonal pilots are adopted. What’s more, we stress that any
prior pilot design clues given to resist attack would also give
information away to Ava.
D. Pilot Randomization and Key Challenge
Pilot randomization can avoid the pilot aware attack without
imposing any prior information on the pilot design. The
common method is to randomly select phase candidates. Note
that each of the phase candidates is defaultly mapped into a
unique quantized sample, chosen from the set A. Since phase
information provides the security guarantee, thus without the
need of huge overheads, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 (Time-domain PIP). During two adjacent
OFDM symbol time, such as, ki, ki+1, i ≥ 0, two pilot phases
φki,m and φki+1,m are kept with fixed phase difference, that
is, φki+1,m − φki,m = φm. Here, φki+1,m and φki,m are both
random but φm is deterministic and publicly known.
The value of C affects the reliability of proposed SMPA
architecture and as discussed in the Procedure 2, pilot ran-
domization also brings the necessity of novel coding theory.
III. HIERARCHICAL 2-D FEATURE CODING FOR SMPA
ARCHITECTURE: ENCODING PART
Basically, any coding strategy includes the encoding and
decoding part. In this section, the encoding part of H2DF
coding is formulated, which embraces three parts, that is,
energy feature extraction, energy feature representation (for
satisfying Procedure 1) and the feature encoding (only pro-
vides the multiuser guarantee of Procedure 2).
A. Energy Feature Extraction
A commonsense is that wireless signal energy is indelible.
Using the technique of eigenvalue ratio based energy detection
(ERED) in [23], we hope to precisely measure the number of
aggregated signals at subcarriers. The number represents the
energy feature that we could extract and encode further.
Let us focus on a physical phenomenon, that is, the signal
(or energy) superposition on each single subcarrier. This will
contribute to our quantitative modelling for the energy feature.
On one hand, if we examine the SAPs employed by each node,
we could find they are random and mutually independent,
leading to the occurrence and superposition of activated and
deactivated subcarriers. In other words, the number of signals
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Fig. 3. Construction of code-frequency domain on which a general description of H2DF encoding/decoding is depicted.
on each single subcarrier and their identities are completely
unknown and unpredictable. On the other hand, this uncer-
tainty extends to the case where the attacker is involved and
configure arbitrary SAPs to interfere LUs. Therefore, each
subcarrier may carry at most K + 1 signals and at least no
signal, depending on the choices of K + 1 SAPs.
To capture the variations of the number of aggregated
signals on arbitrary single subcarrier, a (K + 2)×NT receiving
signal matrix withinK+2 OFDM symbols, denoted byYD, is
created for energy detection. Given the normalized covariance
matrix defined by R̂ = 1
σ2
YDYD
H, we define its ordered
eigenvalues by λK+2 > . . . > λ1 > 0 and construct the test
statistics by T = λK+2
λ1
H0
≷
H0
γ where γ denotes the decision
threshold. The hypothesis H0 means that there exist signals
and H0 means the opposite.
Based on YD, Eq. (49) in [23] provides a decision thresh-
old function γ
∆
= f (NT,K, Pf ), for measuring how many
antennas on one subcarrier are required to achieve a certain
probability of false alarm denoted by Pf . Therefore, we could
establish a single-subcarrier encoding (SSE) principle, finally
encoding the number of detected signals into binary and M -
ary digits.
Definition 1 (SSE). Given fixed K and NT, one subcarrier
can be precisely encoded if, for any ε > 0, there exists a
positive number γ (ε) such that, for all γ ≥ γ (ε), Pf is
smaller than ε.
We should note that f (NT,K, Pf ) is a monotone de-
creasing function of two independent variables, i.e., NT and
Pf but a monotone increasing function of K . For a given
probability constraint ε∗, we could always expect a lower
bound γ (ε∗) satisfying γ (ε∗) = f (NT,K, ε
∗). Under this
equation, we could flexibly configure NT, K and γ (ε
∗) to
make ε∗ approach zero [23]. We also find that the value of γ
achieving zero-ε∗ is decreased with the increase of NT, but
increased with the increase of K .
Using γ (0) as the detection threshold, Alice constructs new
test statistics Ti =
λi
λ1
Hi
≷
Hi
γ (0) , 2 ≤ i ≤ K+1. The hypothesis
Hi means |K + 3− i| signals coexist and Hi+1 means the
opposite. Using this, Alice can determine the number of
coexisting signals on arbitrary single subcarrier. For example,
two signals are recognized only when both HK+1 and HK
hold true.
B. Energy Feature Representation
Basically, we could derive two types of code representing
the energy feature. The first one is binary code and the other
one is M + 1-ary code. To formulate the code, we begin by
constructing the code-frequency domain.
1) Code-Frequency Domain: We denote the binary digit
corresponding to the m-th pilot subcarrier by s1,m satisfying:
s1,m =
{
1 Mm ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(5)
Naturally, the (M + 1)-ary digit is defined by:
s2,m = Mm (6)
Furthermore, we denote a binary code vector set by S1
with S1 = {s1| s1,m ∈ {0, 1} , 1 ≤ m ≤ Lc} where Lc de-
notes the maximum length of the code. Similarly, we denote
the (M + 1)-ary code vector set by S2 satisfying S2 =
{s2| s2,m ∈ {0, . . . ,M} , 1 ≤ m ≤ Lc}.
Finally, a code frequency domain with hybrid binary and
(M + 1)-ary code digits can be formulated as a set of pairs
(s, b) with s ⊂ S1 ∪ S2 and 1 ≤ b ≤ B where b is an integer
representing the subcarrier index of appearance of the code.
The construction process can be depicted in Fig. 3.
2) Achieving Procedure 1: Grouping the code digits on
code-frequency domain, we can derive two types of codes.
Definition 2. We call a B × C binary matrix satisfying B =
[bj,i]1≤j≤B,1≤i≤C , bj,i ∈ s ⊂ S1 and a B × C (M + 1)-
ary matrix satisfying M = [mj,i]1≤j≤B,1≤i≤C ,mj,i ∈ s ⊂
S2 as the feature encoding matrices. The i-th column of B
and M are respectively denoted by bi and mi with bi =[
b1,i · · · bB,i
]T
and mi =
[
m1,i · · · mB,i
]T
. We
call bi a codeword of B of length B and mi a codeword of
M with the same length..
Each LU could represent its energy feature using binary
codeword which also indicates its corresponding SAP.
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Fig. 4. HD model. The starting layer performs signal collection which is interpreted as a superposition process of K+1 SAPs. The same signal information,
divided into two paths, are then passed to the data units in the input layer. For one path, the energy feature extraction is guaranteed and for the other one, the
independence feature extraction is done. The resulted digits are propagated forward through hidden and supervision layer, finally facilitating the presentation
of K codeword vectors of LUs in the output layer.
3) Codeword Arithmetic Principle: Two arithmetic opera-
tions between codewords are formulated, depending on the
specific code definition.
Definition 3. The superposition (SP) sum zi,j = bi
∨
bj , 1 ≤
i, j ≤ C (designated as the digit-by-digit Boolean sum) of two
B-dimensional binary codewords is defined by:
zi,j,k =
{
0 if bk,i = bk,j = 0
1 otherwise
, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ B (7)
where zi,j,k represents the k-th element of vector zi,j . We say
that a binary vector x covers a binary vector y if the Boolean
sum satisfies y∨x = x
Definition 4. The algebraic superposition (ASP) sum (des-
ignated as the digit-by-digit sum) is defined by di,j =
bi+bj , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ C in which two B-dimensional (M + 1)-
ary codewords satisfy:
di,j,k = mk,i +mk,j , ∀1 ≤ k ≤ B (8)
where di,j,k denotes the k-th element of vector di,j .
C. Feature Encoding: Coupling Independence Features with
Coding Diversity
Here we aim to further optimize the feature encoding
matrix. As shown in Fig. 3, this is done, 1) by creating the
potential diversity of cover-free coding across the columns
of binary matrix; 2) integrating the independence feature of
receiving signals into its rows and coupling it with cover-free
coding naturally. We begin our discussion by introducing the
fundamental notion:
Definition 5. A B×C binary matrix B=[bj,i]1≤j≤B,1≤i≤C is
called a H2DF-(K,L,B) code of length B, size C and order
K , if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) The arithmetic operation among codewords in B obeys
the SP principle.
2) Column-Wise Cover-free Coding (Column Optimiza-
tion): For arbitrary two sets of columns, i.e., P ,Q ⊂
{1, 2, . . . , C} such that |P| = K , |Q| = L, and P ∩ Q = ∅,
there exists a row i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , B} such that bi,j = 0, ∀j ∈ P
and bi,j′ = 1, ∀j
′ ∈ Q.
3) Per-Word Independence-Aided Differential Coding
(Row Optimization): For any two positions, i.e., i, j, on the
frequency domain, one within Tc there exists:∨
l∈K
(bi,l ⊕ bj,l ⊕ 1) = di,j (9)
where di,j = f (Ii,j) , Ii,j =
〈
yi[k]
‖yi[k]‖
,
yj [k]
‖yj [k]‖
〉
, ∀k, k ∈ T .
di,j denotes the differential code and 〈·〉 denotes inner product
operation. f represents the differential encoder with decision
threshold γ and satisfies f (x) =
{
0 x ≤ r
1 x > r
.
Four situations could occur on the i-th pilot subcarrier: 1)
No signal exists, that is, yi [k] = wi; 2) Only signals from
Eva exist, that is, yi [k] = g
E
i ni [k]+wi; 3) Only signals from
LUs exists, that is, yi [k] =
Mi∑
j=1
gLj,ixL,j [k] +wi,Mi ≥ 1; 4)
Both of signals from LUs and Eva exist, that is, yi [k] =
Mi−1∑
j=1
gLj,ixL,j [k] + g
E
i ni [k] +wi,Mi ≥ 2.
To identify the principle of designing γ, we give the follow-
ing interpretation. According to law of large numbers, the inner
product between signals from two independent individuals, i.e.
a LU and Ava, approaches zero [24]. On the contrary, the inner
product between signals from the same node can reach a value
with its amplitude equal to one. In theory, the value of r can
thus be configured to be a certain value, i.e., 0.5.
Remark 1. The diversity of column-wise cover-free coding
is a pure code property, independent with the characteristic
of per-word independence-aided differential coding which is
intrinsically a data-driven concept. We stress that the two
codes coexist without affecting each other, and naturally agree
with each other when the number of antennas increases.
In what follows, we will prove that the coding diversity
can perfectly provide multiuser guarantee but lack the ability
of resisting attack without the assistance of the row property
8which has to be exploited in the decoding part. Nevertheless,
we stress that the coding diversity does not make no sense.
The row property has been coupled with and included in the
code but not yet been exploited in the encoding procedure.
Fact 1 (Achieving Multiuser Guarantee of Procedure 2).
We in this paper consider the special case where L = 1. The
cover-free coding is introduced in [25], [26]. In this case,
the boolean sum of any subset of k ≤ K codewords in B
does not cover any codeword that is not in the subset. For a
constant-weight H2DF-(K, 1, B) code, two arbitrary SP sums,
each superimposed by k ≤ K codewords, are identical if and
only if the two codeword sets constituting the two sums are
completely identical as well. This property guarantees the UD
property.
We spilt the columns of H2DF-(K, 1, B) code matrix B
into K independent clusters. The i-th cluster includes [C/K]
columns indexed by Bi and constitutes a so-called submatrix
denoted by [bj∈Bi ] which is exclusively allocated to the i-th
LU. Since the UD property of B has been satisfied, those
submatrices can naturally satisfy the properties of UPrSI
and UPoSI. In this way, H2DF-(K, 1, B) code can support
multiuser guarantee, provided that there is no attack.
Definition 6. A B × C binary matrix M is called a paired
H2DF-(K, 1, B) code of length B, size C and order K , if M,
equal to B, has its codewords obeying the ASP principle
Definition 7. We define the B ×
(
C
k
)
SP-sum matrix
Bk, k = 2, 3, ...,K , which is the collection of all of the
SP sums of codewords from B, taken exactly k at a time.
Correspondingly, the B ×
(
C
k
)
ASP-sum matrix Mk, k =
2, 3, ...,K denotes the collection of all of the ASP sums of
those codewords collected from B, taken exactly k at a time.
Each column of Bk (or Mk) represents a unique SP-sum (or
ASP-sum) codeword.
Let us examine the ability of column property of H2DF en-
coding principle in resisting attack. Ava could use its intended
SAPs to cause confusion on the detection of signals on any vic-
tim subcarrier. For example, we consider cover-free codewords
of three LUs, that is,
[
1 0 0 1
]
,
[
0 0 1 1
]
, and[
1 0 1 0
]
and an codeword from Eva, that is, c =[
1 1 0 0
]
. After detection, Alice could derive the final
superposed binary codeword equal to
[
1 1 1 1
]
, which
actually indicates no any useful information and imposes huge
confusion on cover-free decoding. In this case, the decoding
process is imprecise and multiuser guarantee is paralyzed.
IV. HIERARCHICAL 2-D FEATURE CODING FOR SMPA
ARCHITECTURE: DECODING PART
We in this section attempt to build up the Attack Resis-
tance of Procedure 2 while maintaining the perfect multiuser
guarantee. Basically, we aim to reach the potential, that is, On
the basis of the energy feature, Alice could take advantage of
the independence feature to recover the significant potential of
coding diversity for securing against the hybrid attack. This is
done by upgrading the decoding part of UD property through a
HD model shown in Fig. 4. In this model, operation units with
specific functionalities are connected and distributed among
five sub-layers, including the starting layer, input layer, hidden
layer, supervision layer and output layer. In what follows, we
begin our discussion by the starting layer.
A. Starting Layer (Signal Collection & Mathematical Mod-
eling for Signal Superposition in SMPA Architecture)
Input: Multiple independent signals from K + 1 nodes.
As the start of SMPA architecture, the superposition of
observed signals on subcarriers at Alice brings the super-
position of SAPs and thus the superposition of codewords
mathematically. Two types of codeword superposition can be
characterised by:
b1
∨
· · ·
∨
bK = bS,K ,bS,K
∨
c = bI (10)
and
m1 + · · ·+mK = mS,K ,mS,K + c = mI (11)
where bi ∈ [bj′∈Bi ] and bi = mi, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ K . Here, the
specific value of vector c, determined by the attack behaviors,
is defined by:
c =


[
0 · · · 0 ]T SC[
1 · · · 1 ]T WB-PJ[
0 · · · 1 ]T PB-PJ
(12)
However, the mathematical hints above can not obscure the
fact that what Alice actually receives on subcarriers are still
superimposed signals, rather than the code digits.
Output: The superimposed signals which are stored to the
data units in the next layer.
B. Input Layer (Feature Extraction)
Input: The superimposed signals from the previous layer.
Alice aims to extract features of superimposed signals in
data units, and encode them into code digits. Depending on
features involved, those superimposed signals undergo two
specific independent processes (See Fig. 4), that is, energy
feature extraction and independence feature extraction.
1) Energy Feature Extracting by ERED: The detection
units, configured in this layer, extract energy feature from
superimposed signals in the form of codewords, i. e., bI and
mI. This process is same with the one shown in Section III-A.
bI and mI will be delivered to the digit units configured in
the next layer.
2) Independence Feature Extracting by Inner Product Op-
eration: The inner product units are configured to extract the
independence feature from the superimposed signals in the
form of code matrix, namely, D. See details in Algorithm 1.
Definition 8. A 2-D Differential code is defined by a B ×B
matrix D =
[
dj∈[1,B]
]
with its j-th row dj denoted by dj =[
d1,j · · · dB,j
]
.
Thanks to the feature extraction, the derived D matrix has
the potential of including all the information of codewords
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Fig. 5. Examples of 2-D differential coding; (a) Under WB-PJ attack; (b) Under PB-PJ attack.
Algorithm 1 Formulation of 2-D Differential Code Matrix
1: for i = 1 to i = B do
2: Select superimposed signals at the i-th subcarrier as
the reference input of inner product unit; Use ERED to
determine the i-th binary digit.
3: Input a total of B superimposed signals as the other
input of the same inner product unit.
4: The inner product unit perform inner product operation
between the two inputs. Differential binary code digits
of length B are formulated.
5: Perform XOR operation between the j-th differential
code digit and the i-th reference digit (usually 1 if
signals exist, otherwise 0.). The result is di,j .
6: end for
7: Because a total of B reference digits can be specified
precisely, a total of B codewords of length B is formu-
lated, constituting a 2-D differential code matrix defined
in Definition 8.
employed by LUs and/or Ava. D can contribute to the de-
composition of bI in the sense that it can facilitate the precise
detection of c which is then eliminated from bI.
Output:bI, mI, and D. Those are delivered to the digit
units in the next layer.
C. Codeword Superposition and Uncertainty Principle
It should be stressly noted that unpredictable attack be-
haviors and the corresponding codewords as well as random
utilization of codewords of LUs could prevent Alice from
acquiring the specific codewords within D. The direct result is
that Alice will observe that superimposed codewords coexist
with the un-superimposed ones.
This prompts us to discover and formulate the concept
of CSUP, a basic and deterministic rule followed by those
random codewords within D under various attacks. Undoubt-
edly, CSUP will contribute to the clear understanding of
D, fundamentally facilitating the decomposition of bI in the
following layers.
In order to uncover the secret of CSUP, we need to examine
the codeword superposition process in a smart, explicit and
institutive way. Let us focus on a special stacked matrix T.
Definition 9. Imagine a (K+2)-by-B matrix T = [tj,i]
composed by T =
[
b1 · · · bK c bI
]T
where bi
and bI satisfy Eq. (11). The i-th column of the submatrix
constituted by the first K row is denoted by ti with ti =[
t1,i · · · tK,i
]T
. The sum of elements of ti is defined by
ts,i with ts,i =
K∑
j=1
tj,i. The column index of T
T corresponds
to that of D, or equivalently the index of reference digits.
We cannot know the identities of codewords within T
exactly. In fact, we may not care the exact identities of
codewords, but instead concentrate our attention on the column
and row property of T from the following two views:
Fact 2 (CSUP: Un-superimposed Codewords). If ts,i0 +
tK+1,i0 = 1 holds true, or equivalently, mI,i0 = 1 holds true,
Alice is perfectly able to deduce that the recovered codeword
at the di0 , also namely, the exposed codeword, must be un-
superimposed.
Fact 3 (CSUP: Superimposed Codewords). For any column
i0 satisfying ts,i0 = m ≥ 2, a total of m codewords are surely
superimposed together at this column. Only the superposition
version of m codewords is enabled to be precisely recovered
(or namely exposed) and equal to di0 .
CSUP describes the potential structures of D under hybrid
attacks comprehensively. Two typical examples demonstrating
CSUP could be respectively depicted in Fig. 5. Keep in mind
that CSUP provides a very basic background and technical
support for solving the issues in remainder of subsections. It
causes us to direct our attention to the exposed codewords
which are however instable to appear. Therefore, we could
sufficiently believe that the following process of codeword
classification and identification (CI) could be seriously destabi-
lized. This calls for more advanced and delicate mechanism to
further optimize the decoding process, which will be depicted
in the following layers.
D. Hidden Layer (Attack Identification)
Backing to the hidden layer, we stress that this layer is
different from the previous layers and begins to gradually
resolve the attack related issues.
Input: D, bI, mI, BK and MK in the storage units.
As shown in Fig. 4, those inputs are fed to the identification
units which are responsible for two tasks, that is, 1) precisely
identify the current attack mode (SC, WB-PJ or PB-PJ); 2)
10
Algorithm 2 Codeword CI Under WB-PJ and SC Attack
1: (For WB-PJ attack) Derive a novel paired H2DF codeword
by performing the ASP sum betweenmI and a vector with
all digit given“-1” value;
2: Compare this codeword with each column of matrix MK
and find the index of the column equal to this codeword
exactly;
3: Back to the matrix BK and find the superimposed code-
word bS,K at the same column index.
4: (For both WB-PJ attack and SC) Decompose bS,K into
bi, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ K based on the column-wise cover free
coding characteristic.
differentiate the observed codeword in the current mode from
those codewords under potential interfering modes.
1) Identification of WB-PJ Attack: CSUP tells us that the
codewords under WB-PJ attack is very distinctive compared
with those under other attacks. The principle can be summa-
rized as follows:
Proposition 1. When zero digit does not exist in the inputs of
bI and D, WB-PJ attack happens. This unique characteristic
differentiates WB-PJ attack from other two attacks, i.e., SC
and PB-PJ attack.
2) Identification of SC and PB-PJ Attack: Theoretically,
we need to examine the existence of c and further clarify
the superposition relationship between bS,K and c such that
we can directly identify SC and PB-PJ attack. However, what
Alice observes in practice is the their superposition version,
i.e., bI and mI, rather than bS,K and c. We stress that BK
and MK make the identification of attack more easily.
Proposition 2. When bI /∈ BK holds true, there exists bI 6=
bS,K , which means that c cannot be covered by bS,K . In this
case, there must exist one column indexed by ia, ia ∈ D such
that cia , i.e., tK+1,ia in T, is equal to 1, with ts,ia = 0. The
attack is classified as PB-PJ attack or WB-PJ attack. We can
surely differentiate the PB-PJ attack from WB-PJ attack where
all the inputs of D are uniquely non-zero digits.
The proof is easy since if otherwise there does not exist
ts,i = 0 ∀i, then c must be covered by bS,K and bI = bS,K .
Proposition 3. When bI ∈ BK holds true, there exists bI =
bS,K and c is covered by bS,K . On this basis, SC occurs if
mI = mS,K , and otherwise, PB-PJ attack happens.
In practice, we should note that the above theoretical results
depend on how to determine the relationship between bI ( mI
) andBK (MK). In order to achieve this, Alice can searchBK
(MK), find whether bI ∈ BK or mI ∈ MK holds true and
further make decisions shown in above theorems. The overall
algorithm can be shown in Fig. 6.
Output: Identified attack mode and the superimposed code-
word under the identified mode.
E. Supervision Layer (Codeword CI)
Input: the superimposed codeword, i.e., bI or bS,K , under
the identified attack mode, BK and MK in the storage units.
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Fig. 6. Flow chart of attack identification.
Algorithm 3 BFPI Algorithm, also see Fig. 7
1: Formulate two hypotheses as follows:
H0 : bK,j0 → LUs,bK,j1 → Ava
H1 : bK,j1 → LUs,bK,j0 → Ava (13)
2: (Backward Propagation (BP)) For H0, bK,j0 and bK,j1
can both be decomposed into original codewords in B,
i.e.,
{
bi,0
}
i=1,...K
and
{
bi,1
}
i=1,...K
.
3: (Forward Propagation (FP)) According to the definition
of H2DF code, any two different superimposed codewords
can be decomposed into two different codeword sets.
Therefore, the ASP sum must be different. Calculate the
ASP sum as bS,0 = b1,0 + · · ·+ bK,0 + bK,j1 .
4: (Decision) If bS,0 is equal to the observation, then we
know that H0 is valid, otherwise, H1 is valid.
The CI units are responsible for decomposing bI or bS,K ,
and executing the following CI task for the derived codewords.
For WB-PJ and SC attack, decomposing bI or bS,K could
be done in Algorithm 2.
For PB-PJ attack, the flexible choices of c could cause two
results. 1) When bI = bS,K , c is covered by bS,K . This
issue of codeword decomposition and codeword CI could be
resolved using Algorithm 2. 2) Otherwise when bI 6= bS,K , c
is not covered by bS,K . The situation is rather complicate.
In principle, the precise decomposition of bI into bS,K is
guaranteed iff the exposed codeword di∈D (See its definition
in Fact 2) is precisely identified as c which is then eliminated
exactly from bI. The challenge lies in how to identify the
identities of di∈D which are usually indeterministic due to
the random utilization of codewords.
Problem 3 (Indeterministic Exposed Codewords). When PB-
PJ attack happens and bI 6= bS,K exists, the identities of
elements in D are random and unpredictable due to the
random codewords employed by the overall K + 1 nodes.
Therefore the identities of di∈D are unknown. Any prior
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Fig. 7. Example of BFPI Algorithm in the supervision layer, for identifying
the confused codewords bK,j0 and bK,j1 . (a) Graph of CI units under BFPI
Algorithm for PB-PJ attack; (b) Codeword decomposition for the confused
codewords bK,j0 and bK,j1 ; (c) Flow chart of BFPI Algorithm. .
constraints that are imposed on the set for resolving this issue
will also break down the randomness of original codewords
and must not be considered.
Institutively, the precise decomposition of bI into bS,K is
out of the question. However, if we exhaust all possibilities
of c which actually could be any codeword, we find that
the codeword CI is intrinsically hindered by two types of
confusions.
1) The identification confusion caused by c when c ∈ BK
holds true. In this case, there must exist ia such that dia = c.
Besides, we know that bS,K ∈ BK always holds true.
Therefore, there exists the following problem:
Problem 4. A superposition identification (SPI) problem hap-
pens, that is, c cannot be differentiated from bS,K since they
are both in the same matrix BK .
Note that the case where c = bS,K does not affect the
ultimate decoding of codewords. Without loss of generality, we
define the exact occurrence of c and bS,K in BK by bK,j0 and
bK,j1 . The identities of bK,j0 and bK,j1 are both unknown in
practice. To completely resolve the above problem, we develop
the technique of Back/Forward Propagation Identification
(BFPI). The details are given in Algorithm 3 and an example
of BFPI for 7-digit codewords under K = 3 LUs can be seen
in the Fig. 7.
2) The identification confusion caused by c when c belongs
to the codebook B, that is, c ∈
K⋃
i=1
Bi. More specifically, c
could be located in any uncertain submatrix, or namely, c
contaminates one submatrix. There exists c ∈ {di}i∈D .
Definition 10 (Multi-User Codeword Distribution (MUCD)).
MUCD means that there always exists a unique codeword in
use for each submatrix [bj∈Bi ].
However, the indeterministic relationship between c and
exposed codeword di causes a random disturbance (RD)
Algorithm 4 Codeword CI
1: Search the set D and derive di, i ∈ D. Those codewords
include the one from Eva and those from LUs.
2: Alice select an exposed digit with position id ∈ D and
then configure the id-th digit of bI to be zero. bi, ∀i, 1 ≤
i ≤ K is recovered by searching BK for the codeword
identical to the revised bI.
3: Alice examines the overall distribution of bi, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤
K in B and determines the selected digit id belonging
to the true codeword of Ava only when the distribution
satisfies MUCD. According to this digit, then c = did .
Then Alice can finally confirm bi, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ K in this
case to be the right codewords from LUs.
problem in the recovery operation
Problem 5. Confusing case: when there exist j1 and a set
D0 ⊆ D,D0 6= ∅ such that ∀i, i ∈ D0, di and c are
located within the same submatrix
[
bj∈Bj1
]
, c could not
be differentiated from di∈D0 . Identifiable case: Otherwise, c
could be differentiated from di∈D0 using Algorithm 4. This
is done by examining whether or not the recovered MUCD
is true. However, Alice could not predict the occurrence fre-
quency of two cases since the exposed codewords are random,
which reduces the reliability of pilot encoding/decoding in this
architecture.
RD problem causes an instable codeword CI for LUs. We
will analyze this phenomenon in the next section since in this
section we only focus on the design of architecture.
Output: Precise bi, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ K under SC and WB-PJ
attack; Unstably identified bi, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ K for PB-PJ attack,
F. Output Layer
This layer is configured for storing the codewords classified
and identified from the previous layer.
V. RELIABILITY BOUND CONTRACTION THEORY
In this section, we exploit the concept of IEP to measure the
reliability of SMPA. But, our main work is to mathematically
characterize the instability in this reliability and then aim to
answer two questions, that is, how to reduce the instability
and what level of stability can be achieved. This will be done
by our proposed RBC Theory.
A. PA Reliability and Its Instability
In this hybrid attack scenario, the codeword identification
error occurs due to the PB-PJ attack, rather than WB-PJ and
SC attack. This could be easily proved using Proposition 1, 2
and 3.
Theorem 1. Given K users and NLP subcarriers, the IEP
which is denoted by P under H2DF-(K, 1, B) code with size
C is bounded by:
Plower ≤ P ≤ Pupper (14)
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where Plower =
1
C
and Pupper =
1
2K . The reliability of SMPA
is defined by
RS = −log10P (15)
Proof. We assume that Eva is interested in the i0-th LU and
chooses a random codeword from submatrix
[
bj∈Bi0
]
as c.
What is observed at Alice is that the exposed codewords from
LUs could be randomly located in arbitrary one of K possible
submatrices and independent with the codeword choice of
Eva. The worst case happens if the confusing case occurs.
The probability is equal to 1/K and in this case, the right
identification happens with probability 1/2. The final IEP is
calculated as 1/2K.
Otherwise, a best case (i.e., the identifiable case) occurs.
The IEP is then transformed into the probability of the
occurrence of duplicate codewords among the decomposed
codewords bi, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ K , and thus calculated as 1/C.
The non-tight IEP bounds tell us that the exact evaluation
of SMPA reliability depends on the realization of SMPA.
From a long-term perspective, we can think that the SMPA
reliability fluctuates in time. Everytime SMPA is run, the
differing random input (codewords) leads to a different random
output, or the realization, of the SMPA process. The realization
of SMPA process denoted by X for the outcome IEP P is the
function X (t, P ), defined by t 7→ X (t, P ). However, how
to model the statistic process is our focus in the future and
instead we hope to find a easy-to-implement technique to avoid
this uncertainty smartly even though it means sacrificing some
performance.
To pursue the matter further we define the maximum IEP
difference between arbitrary two realizations of SMPA process
within all possible time slices, as the long-term instability.
More specifically, we have:
Definition 11. The long-term instability in SMPA reliability
is defined by:
SR = log10 (Pupper/PIower) (16)
Basically, precise repeated assessment is very critical for
SMPA as we do not hope to encounter a situation where every
time the system operator uses it, the evaluation of its reliability
is provided imprecisely. Therefore, the proposed technique
should be able to reduce SR to zero.
B. Observation on the Exposed Codewords
Backing to the RD problem, we find that the key of reducing
SR lies in how to reduce the occurrence frequency of Con-
fusing Case. Basically, it requires that Alice is able to more
precisely locate the scope of the position fluctuation of exposed
codewords in B and further differentiate between different
results. The most important is to discover the controllable
variable achieving this.
We find that the submatrix-level resolution is low. We bring
up the subject of the low submatrix-level resolution here as
each LU is solely assigned with one submatrix and there
exists only K choices in total for each LU. In this sense, the
low resolution makes the scope of the position fluctuation of
exposed codewords relatively extensive. Therefore, everytime
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Fig. 8. Identification enhancement for the confusing case. For instance,
Alice identifies the sub-codebook
[
bj∈B1
]
as the contaminated codebook.
(a) The wrong decision happens because assuming any one of two exposed
codewords in
[
bj∈B1
]
as c which is further eliminated from bI will generate
true MUCD; (b) Transform the wrong decision to the right decision with the
help of segmented submatrices and MUCD.
LUs select their own codewords obeying MUCD and Eva
employs c which is identical to the codeword within the same
submatrix as one LU of interest, the probability that the set
of exposed codewords includes c is high. This can be seen in
Fig. 8 (a).
However, an interesting phenomenon is that the codeword-
level resolution is very high, namely, a huge number of
candidate codewords for each LU exist.
C. RBC Theory: Code Partition and Upper-Lower Bound
Tradeoff
The above observation inspires us to perform codebook
partition for each submatrix [bj∈Bi ] , 1 ≤ i ≤ K , in other
words, the controllable variable, denoted by N , now is identi-
fied as the number of segmented submatrices. Theoretically,
if each of LUs is assigned with arbitrarily one of segmented
submatrices, the codeword-level resolution is reduced and the
lower bound of IEP is enlarged. Fortunately, the submatrix-
level resolution will be thus improved and the scope of
the position fluctuation of exposed codewords is restricted.
Fig. 8(b) shows how the recovered MUCD in confusing case
is able to be transformed to be identifiable. Then the upper
bound is reduced.
Fact 4 (Upper-Lower Bound Tradeoff). On one hand, the
larger N is, the lower the upper bound is. On the other hand,
the larger N will bring the less codewords for pilot coding
and therefore the larger lower bound.
Remark 2. Three points need to be identified. 1) Code
partition does not affect the randomness of codewords; 2)
Code partition does not affect the randomness of exposed
codewords; 3) Code partition reduces solely the occurrence
probability that both c and the exposed codewords of LUs
occur in one same segmented submatrix.
Note that each node does not need to inform Alice of
any valuable information, such as, the index of segmented
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submatrix as Alice is enabled to identify the index employed
because of the multiuser guarantee.
Theorem 2. Given N segmented submatrices for each sub-
matrix, the IEP under PB-PJ attack for K LUs using H2DF-
(K, 1, B) code is updated and bounded by:
N
C
≤ P ≤ 1
2KN
(17)
Proof. Due to the uncertainty of which segmented submatrix
is adopted by the i0-th LU, Eva randomly chooses a codeword
in one of the N segmented submatrices of
[
bj∈Bi0
]
as c.
In comparison to the worst case without code partition in
Theorem 1, now the identification error happens iff there exists
an exposed codeword occurring exactly within the segmented
submatrix employed by Eva, rather than the original submatrix.
We can calculate IEP as 1/2K × 1/N . For the best case,
the occurrence of duplicate codewords among decomposed
codewords is recalculated as N/C since the size of codebook
for pilot coding is reduced to C/N .
Theorem 3. Given N segmented submatrices for each subma-
trix, the optimal tradeoff between the upper and lower bounds
of IEP for K LUs under PB-PJ attack is achieved iff:
N=
√
C
2K
(18)
The optimal and exact expression of IEP is derived by:
P =
√
1
2CK
(19)
In this case, SR and RS are respectively equal to zero and
1
2 log102CK , achieving the stable and highly-reliable SMPA
performance.
By configuring N
C
= 12KN , we can derive the above optimal
N . The codeword CI can also be seen in Algorithm 4.
D. Code Construction and Performance Analysis
In order to analyze the coding performance in practical com-
munications systems, it is required that the expression of C
should be specified, which depends on the specific construction
method of cover-free code. We consider the maximum distance
separable (MDS) code [27] based code construction method.
The reason is that such a code may be conveniently augmented
with additional words, without decreasing its distance, hence
its order, (or namely the number K of LUs) by letting the
number of ones increases suitably. It means that this method
is resilient even when signals on subcarriers are interfered
and thus the number of signals in detection is changed. The
specific construction method can be found in [25]. The overall
performance of H2DF-(K, 1, B) code here refers to the code
rate, antenna and frequency-domain resource overheads and
IEP.
The rate of H2DF-(K, 1, B) code of length B and cardinal-
ity C, denoted by R (C,B), is defined in [26] by:
R (C,B)=log2C/B (20)
Under MDS code based code construction, the size of B satis-
fies B = NLP = q [1 +K (k − 1)] , C = qk, q ≥ K (k − 1) ≥
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS AND VALUES
Simulation Parameters Values
City scenario Urban/non-line-of-sight (NLOS)
Antennas at BS Uniform linear array (ULA)
Maximum number of LUs K ≤ 19
Channel fading and scattering model Rayleigh and One-ring [5]
Carrier frequency f =2GHz
Bandwidth 20MHz
Coherence bandwidth 20KHz
Coherence time Tc = c/(fv)
Maximum velocity of LUs v=360km/h
Available subcarriers for H2DF coding NA
P
= NL
P
≤ 1200/3;
Available subcarriers for CIR estimation NA
E
= NL
E
≤ 128;
Number of channel taps Ls = 6;
Pilot insertion mode for CIR estimation Block type
Channel estimator [5]
Modulation OFDM with normal CP
Slot structure 1 slot= 7 OFDM symbols
3,K ≥ 2, which mathematically denotes the frequency-
domain resource overheads. Considering the H2DF encoding
process, we notice that the detection process depends on NT
and K and the codebook formulation process depends on
NLP and K . Therefore, we introduce the function relationship
among NT, N
L
P and K as follows:
γ (ε∗ = 0) = f (NT,K, ε
∗ = 0) , NLP = q [1 +K (k − 1)] ,
q ≥ K (k − 1) ≥ 3,K ≥ 2.
(21)
where the function f is the one defined by the Eq. (49) in [23].
The IEP, depending on NLP and K , thus can be formulated
as follows:
Theorem 4. With MDS based code construction method for
H2DF-(K, 1, B) code, IEP can be simplified into:
P =
√√√√ [1 +K (k − 1)]k
2
(
NLP
)k
K
(22)
where NLP ≥ K (k − 1) [1 +K (k − 1)], K (k − 1) ≥ 3.
Using C = qk, Eq. (19) and (21), we can easily derive the
above theorem.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we simulate the performance of SMPA
from two main perspectives, that is, the coding perspective
and the CIR estimation perspective. For the former, we focus
on five metrics, that is, the code rate, upper-lower bound
tradeoff curve, the curve of instability variations, the IEP
curve under the optimal bound tradeoff and the overheads in
coding. We are more concerned about the configuration of
system parameters, i.e., k, K , q, NLP , on the impact of those
metrics. Usually, k is set to be 2 and 3, which is enough
under the practical system configuration. We should also note
that NLP is a function of K and q. Based on the constraint
of the prime power q, we know that NLP is bounded by
K (k − 1) [1 +K (k − 1)]. Under this condition, we configure
K and k artificially and examine the influence of variations
of NLP on the code rate. To evaluate other four metrics, we
assume that NLP always achieves its lower bound, that is,
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Fig. 9. (a) The code rate R (C,B) versus NL
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under various k and K; (b) The upper-lower bound tradeoff curve under various K and NL
P
; (c) The instability
in SMPA reliability versus NL
P
under various k and K .
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Fig. 10. (a) The IEP under optimal tradeoff versus NL
P
with various k and K; (b) The frequency domain overheads under various K; (c) The NMSE versus
SNR of LUs under various NT.
K (k − 1) [1 +K (k − 1)]. For the channel estimation part, we
consider the basic configuration shown in Table II.
Fig. 9 (a) presents the curve of code rate versus NLP . It indi-
cates us three facts: 1) Increasing K and NLP will lower down
the code rate; For example, the code rate ranges from 0.04 to
0.03 when increasingK from 4 to 16 at k = 2 and NLP = 300.
2) Increasing k will increase the code rate; For example, the
code rate increases from 0.03 to 0.04 if k is increased from 2
to 3 whenK = 4 and NLP = 400.3) IncreasingK will increase
the overheads of NLP since the lower bound of available N
L
P ,
that is, K (k − 1) [1 +K (k − 1)], increases with the increase
of K . For example, when k = 3, the increase of K from 4
to 8 will bring the lower bound of NLP increasing from 72 to
272.
Fig. 9(b) presents the upper-lower bound tradeoff curve. We
plot ten discrete points on which there exists a relationship
between the upper bound 12KN and lower bound
N
C
. N is
configured from 1 to 10. The reason is that N should be no
more than the optimal value, i.e., N=
√
C
2K . In this context,
we configure k to be 2 and 3 and K to be 2 and 8. As we can
see, there exists a tradeoff curve on which the upper bound
has to be sacrificed to maintain a certain level of lower bound.
Fig. 9 (c) presents the curves of instability in SMPA
reliability versus the number of segmented submatrices under
K = 2, 8, 18. Considering Eq.(16) and Eq.(17), we can know
that SR is equal to:
SR = −2log10N +G (23)
where G = klog10B− klog10 [1 +K (k − 1)]− log102K and
1 ≤ N ≤ NLP
K+1
[√
1
2K
]
. From the curves, we can see that
the increase of K makes the instability approach zero more
quickly. This demonstrates that our proposed RBC theory is
very suitable for multiuser environment.
Fig. 10(a) presents the value of IEP versus NLP . It indicates
us three facts: 1) Increasing k and NLP will lower down the
IEP; For example, IEP ranges from 7.5× 10−3 to 3.4× 10−3
with the increase of k from 2 to 3 whenK = 8 andNLP = 300.
When k = 3 and K = 8, IEP decreases from 4.4 × 10−3
to 2.2 × 10−3 with the increase of NLP from 250 to 400.
2) Increasing K will increase the IEP; For example, when
NLP = 400 and k = 2, the IEP increases from 4.4 × 10−3
to 5.6 × 10−3 and further to 7.5 × 10−3, with the increase
of K from 4 to 8 to 16. 3) Increasing K will also increase
the overheads of NLP since the lower bound of available N
L
P
increases with the increase of K . In literature [7], the IEP
performance is 0.5 if the two conditions hold true: 1) Eva
launches randomly-imitating attack after acquiring B and 2)
Its array spatial fading correlation is not known by Alice, or
otherwise Eva has the same mean AoA with LU of interest.
In comparison to the scheme in [7], our scheme is more
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robust under the three conditions and able to break down this
IEP floor, i.e., 0.5, because it is a pure information coding
technique, not depending on the spatial fading correlation
models.
In Fig. 10(b), we simulate the coding overheads in the
respect of NLP . Note that the antenna resource overheads in
terms of NT can be seen Fig. ??. We do not simulate it again
here. As we can see, NLP increases linearly with the increase of
the size of codebook, i.e., C, or equivalently q. Theoretically,
NLP is a linear function of q when q ≥ K . For example, when
q changes from 12 to 20 at K = 8, namely, C increases from
144 to 400, NLP increases about from 108 to 180.
In Fig. 10(c), we stimulate the performance of CIR esti-
mation. Normalized mean squared error (NMSE) is simulated
versus signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of LUs under arbitrary SNR
of Ava. For the sake of simplicity, we assume ρL,m = ρL, ∀m.
The performance under this type of estimator is not influenced
by the specific value of ρA due to the subspace projection
property. We do not consider the case where there is no
attack since in this case LS estimator is a natural choice.
The CIR estimation under PTS attack is only presented since
the estimation error floor under PTN and PTJ attack can
be easily understood to be very high. The binned scheme
proposed in [22] is simulated as an another comparison
scheme. As we can see, attack could cause a high-NMSE
floor on CIR estimation. This phenomenon can also be seen
in the binned scheme [22]. However, the estimation in our
proposed framework breaks down this floor and its NMSE
gradually decreases with the increase of transmitting antennas
and gradually approaches the NMSE curve under perfect
minimum mean-square error (MMSE) case which serves as
a performance benchmark.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we designed a H2DF coding theory for a
multi-user multi-antenna OFDM system to protect the pilot
authentication process over frequency-selective fading chan-
nels. In this scheme, a framework of H2DF coding based
encoding/decoding mechanism for randomized pilots through
a HD model was developed, bringing about the benefits of
stable and highly-reliable SMPA. Low IEP was formulated by
upper and lower bounds. We verified the tradeoff relationship
between the upper bound and lower bound. We developed a
bound contraction theory through which an optimal upper-
lower bound tradeoff can be achieved using a codebook
partition technique such that the exact bound of IEP can
be identified. Some necessary performance and simulations
results were presented to verify the robustness of proposed
scheme against pilot aware attack.
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